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Abstract
Sexuality is not possible without phantasm, phantasm  
is not possible without the imaginaries maintained by private 
property. Private property resides in surplus economy.  
Surplus economy is libidinal. The question would then be:  
how much could sexuality cost? Or does sexuality vanish if the 
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I
When we question what sexuality is we also have to ask whether it is 
a universal category or whether it is biased—by economic, social, and 
class constellations of certain historical periods or social formations. 
 Another question would be whether sexuality and sex are identical no-
tions and whether one can substitute another. 
These questions arise as long as sexuality is not reducible to any sta-
tistics of sexual intercourse, but is rather conditioned by various modes of 
surplus: in desire, in economic production, in language. That sexuality is 
libidinally biased and hence inscribed into a broader context of libidinal 
economy is obvious, so the question follows: in the case of production 
functioning without surplus value, can it be regarded as non-libidinal 
(e.g., the distributive economy of socialism), and if so, would this conjec-
ture make it possible to dispense with sexuality? 
The argument against such an assumption is that the Soviet socialist 
economy was to a considerable extent also capitalist, only on behalf of a 
state, so that it always contained the libidinal dimension which was mere-
ly suppressed.  Another argument is that sexuality, desire, pleasure, the 
unconscious, are universal components in the construction of a subject in 
general. If they thereby happen to be suppressed they manifest them-
selves obliquely in some other, not necessarily sexual, experience or its 
physical implementation. 
I would consider both arguments as doubtful. Distributive economy—
whether functioning well or badly—was grounded on use value. This is 
why the commodity in Soviet social space didn’t fit into the phantasmatic 
image of a desire. Apart from being phantasmatically imagined, desire has 
to be materially embodied: it needs to be produced, it needs to become 
and manifest itself as a product, and consequently as a commodity in to 
which the phantasms and desires can be inscribed. This implies that the 
economy and production should fit into the material realization of such a 
phantasm. Sexuality for Foucault was a clinical category, for Freud a psy-
chic one, for Lacan it was linguistic. But in all these cases one point is 
overlooked. Sexuality being the kernel of desire cannot but construct itself 
via implementing its imaginaries materially—which makes it inevitably 
concomitant to the economy and to the types of production at hand. 
For Lacan or Deleuze, social infrastructure is permeated by sexuality, 
the unconscious is dispersed within it. Nevertheless, missing in their re-
search is the possibility of the evacuation of all libidinal parameters as the 
result of the sublation of libidinal economy. In other words, if the type of 
economic production is not supplying the possibility to generate imagi-
naries of sexuality and the material sources to implement them, the ques-
tion would be whether sexuality is being acted out at all? (Neither Lacan 
nor Deleuze endeavored to research such a society).
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From this standpoint, the second argument regarding the all-encom-
passing universality of sexuality might be discarded, then making the pre-
supposition that the latency of sexuality in Soviet society (the absence of 
any libidinally biased images in media, social space, art, the censorship for 
issues of sexuality as against the narratives of love) was not just the out-
come of bureaucratic restrictions, but stemmed from the specific social 
and economic modes of production.1
II
Andrey Platonov’s short pamphlet “The Anti-Sexus” is written as an 
advertisement for a device providing coital service, produced in France 
and mainly distributed in capitalist countries. This machine of sexual sat-
isfaction’s ultimate biopolitical function varies, from regulating sexual 
life in marriage to the evacuation of sexuality from relationships in favor 
of friendship and enthusiastic labor and production, up to the overall ex-
tinction of prostitution, or even so far as to make marriage obsolete to 
increase workers’ productivity in factories. In other words, it is meant to 
dispense with the libidinal striving of humanity, as well as with the trou-
bles of the unconscious altogether by supplying a universal device of 
quick sexual satisfaction. Although the text is written on behalf of a West-
ern company, it implicitly refers to the biopolitics of sexuality in early 
Soviet society with a plan to drastically reframe the ethical, ideological, 
psychic, and physiological map not only of a concrete Soviet society, but 
of human existence in general. 
However, what the Anti-Sexus device aims to remove from life and 
communication is not so much sex, but rather sexuality: libidinality, de-
sire, the drive. It is not removing the function of sexual intercourse—the 
nominal implementation of the sexual act is preserved in the application 
of this device. What is obliterated is precisely the yearning, the libidinal, 
the surplus element, and the elusive “something.” Genital satisfaction as 
against sexuality does not necessarily reside in desire—it is implemented 
as an immediate bio-physiological need. Applying the Anti-Sexus device 
for such stimulation enables people to get rid of the troublesome realm of 
desire. Tearing libidinal drives away from the realm of physiological ne-
cessities helps to shift focus on to social activity by directly satisfying 
genital needs. 
This mischievous and ambivalent pamphlet could be read in two reg-
isters—as grotesque irony and as a straightforward message, implicitly 
presupposing that the society from which sexuality is evicted already ex-
1 Interestingly, the Soviet artist Boris Mikhailov (2007), who has been working 
with issues of gender and body since the early 1960s, said he could only photograph 
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ists and in which there are certain reasons to regard sexuality, libidinal 
desire and the unconscious as the obsolete sides of social life. 
Another question arising from this text is whether this Anti-Sexus 
machine is a masturbation device or not. It nominally functions as a tool 
of self-satisfaction. However, what hampers this device from being a mas-
turbation tool is its compulsory and open representation in public space. 
It deals with publicly observed sexual satisfaction as a necessity, then lo-
sing its libidinal aureole and becoming a mere social function.
III
If we look at the works of Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov,2 the 
short manifestos by Andrey Platonov and at the later research of Evald 
Ilyenkov, we can see they are all vocabularies of social emancipation 
grounded on the notion of consciousness rather than the unconscious, 
consequently marking a watershed between psychoanalysis and Marxist 
thought. These authors’ treatment of the notion of consciousness implies 
a dispute between the impact of the unconscious and the psychic alto-
gether. In his well-known and very much disputed work Freudianism, Vo-
loshinov (1976) juxtaposes Psychoanalysis and Marxism, according to 
him consciousness is only a social and never an individual consciousness. 
In Ilyenkov’s “Dialectics of Abstract and Concrete,” consciousness can 
only take the form of social consciousness (1991: 275–94). It is the screen 
of generality where the general is what speaks with the voice of all and 
any. Consciousness in this case stops to be the capacity of individual in-
trospection, to be the function of transcendental reflection. 
In his Analysis of Consciousness in Works by Marx, Mamardashvili 
writes that Marx’s approach to economic phenomena does not infer psy-
chic operations:
(Marx) constructed his research so that already in the point of departure 
he had to deal with the systems, functioning and realized via conscious-
ness. These were for him the social and economic systems. Hence it be-
came possible to consider consciousness as the function, as the attribute 
of the social system, deducing its contents and form from the intersec-
tions and differentiations in the system and not from the simple reflec-
tion of the object in the subject’s perception (Mamardashvili, 1972, own 
translation).
2 Some texts by Valentin Voloshinov referring to the issues of psychoanalysis 




But if all social data is reflected by consciousness then contact with 
external reality is not conditioned by the unconscious. The general criti-
cism of psychoanalysis instigated by Vygotsky and Voloshinov posited 
that the unconscious has its role, but cannot be substantialized. To claim 
that the psyche and sexuality are independent realms impenetrable by 
consciousness was an exaggeration on the part of Voloshinov in Freudian-
ism. But the motivation for such a stance was not so much in disputing the 
existence of the unconscious and its psychoanalytical treatment, but 
rather an ethical demand asserting that in general the unconscious and 
psychoanalysis cannot exert a social function. The unconscious was un-
derstood as a realm unable to attain the dimension of the general, and to 
truly imply social (common) interest. The unconscious elements were in-
ferred just as something non-conscious, or not-yet-conscious, hence they 
didn’t have to be regarded as an autonomous sphere of the psyche, since 
treating them within a framework of the psyche and by means of the psy-
choanalytical method would distance them from objective reality. If this 
is so, body and physiology should not necessarily be considered within 
the prism of psychics, but rather remain in the context of the materialistic 
realm of biology. Biology and physiology are transcribed more easily and 
directly into the social (and hence economically biased terms) than into 
the psychic ones, subject to psychoanalytical treatment. Thus, for all the 
above mentioned authors the psychoanalytical treatment of the uncon-
scious, sexuality and psyche was considered to be the forced libidinization 
of all forms of life, its subjection to the pleasure principle. 
In his short text “But a Human has One Soul,” Platonov writes:
The primary function in the life of a man was not thought, not con-
sciousness, but the sexual drive—the striving to reproduce life, the first 
clash with death, with the wish of immortality and eternity.
We live at the time when sex is devoured by thought. The dark and beau-
tiful passion is evicted from life due to consciousness. Philosophy of the 
proletariat discovered consciousness and it supports the struggle of con-
sciousness with the ancient, but still living beast. In this struggle resides 
the sense of the revolution nurturing the spirit of humanity.
Bourgeoisie gave birth to the proletariat, sex(пол3)-generated conscious-
ness. Sexuality is the soul of the bourgeoisie, consciousness is the soul of 
the proletariat. The bourgeoisie and sex completed their task in life—they 
should be abolished  (Platonov 1988: 531–33, own translation).
Interestingly, when Vygotsky and Luria wrote in 1925 a rather com-
plimentary foreword to Freud’s “Beyond Pleasure Principle” (1990 
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[1925]: 29–37), their main argument in Freud’s defense was that in his 
description of the realm beyond pleasure, Freud managed to return to 
pure biology and evade psychics. Psychics for the Soviet Marxists was 
some kind of euphemism for spiritualism. What they approved of in this 
work by Freud is how psychics is exceeded by broader biological proce-
dures and is thus considered to be part of a bigger realm of biological 
phenomena. Vygotsky claims that Freud’s todestrieb (death drive) over-
comes the libidinal principle of drive, unraveling in it a materialistic, 
biological angle (1990: 29–37).
The reason biological forces are preferable to psychic ones in the 
works of both Vygotsky and Voloshinov is due to the “conservative” ten-
dencies of biology. The fact that biological phenomena are able to be di-
rectly affected by the outward, non-individual forces of the material and 
social environment enables social life to be inscribed into the general di-
mension of history. In other words, the only forces able to transform our 
biological dimension are social ones, and they are more applicable to the 
body and its physiology than to psychics and its libidinal genealogy. So 
Freud can only be approved of if his treatment of psychics can be trans-
lated into the combination of two tendencies: the conservative-biologi-
cal, and the progressive­sociological—the two tendencies that could con-
struct a dialectics of societal development. 
Voloshinov’s argument in Freudianism is similar—it unfolds in favor 
of biology due to its fusibility with social infrastructure. He interprets 
psychoanalysis as an artificial transposition of biological issues into a 
psychic context. According to Voloshinov, in psychoanalysis the contents 
of classical subjective psychology was molded into the newly and artifi-
cially montaged terrain of psychics, sexuality, and the unconscious (1976: 
67–75).
One of the principal rebukes by Voloshinov is that the unconscious is 
in fact conscious. He insists that the work of the unconscious is not as 
contingent or mechanical as Freud would claim it to be. On the contrary, 
it inherits many parameters of subjective psychology which identify psy-
chics with consciousness, therefore Voloshinov disputes the necessity to 
derive separate realms for the functioning of desires and phantasmatic 
imaginaries (1976: 67–75). According to him, it would be more appropri-
ate to allege that something unconscious acquires certain specific forms 
only on entering consciousness, that is, with the aim of temporary inner 
self-observation and introspection. In other words, we can interpret the 
unconscious as a force that acquires certain form and content only after 
going through conscious procedures, so that the unconscious can only be 
considered as one of the functions of consciousness and not the other way 
round—as in psychoanalysis—when consciousness is just the imaginari-
ness of reality serving as just a material to unravel the unconscious. In his 
seminars on the “I,” Lacan explicitly states that the system of conscious-
ness didn’t fit into Freud’s theory (2009: 155–62). The “I” that is inscribed 
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in being, in reality (social context) does not coincide with the “I” of the 
subject of the unconscious. The “I” of the social context is imaginary, il-
lusionary, until it does not become the “I” of the unconscious. The uncon-
scious is definitely intersubjective and dispersed, but nevertheless its 
analytical sphere is confined to the analysis of a subject. 
It should also be remarked that the unconscious it is constructed by 
desire, and as Lacan many times explicitly claims in the seminars on the 
“I,” desire has nothing to do with consciousness.  Lacan actually empha-
sizes the fact that Freud treated consciousness either as a filter of reality, 
that is, as the instrument of its perception, or as the self­reflective Carte-
sian machine that failed to be efficient. In Psychoanalysis, the “I” is not 
cognized in a frame of consciousness. This is the conjecture that brings a 
specific consequence: namely, that it is the unconscious that is able to 
deal with intersubjectivity and objective realia, whereas consciousness is 
only for individual introspection that just remains imaginary. However, 
despite the broadened scope the unconscious acquires in psychoanalysis, 
in comparison with consciousness, the focus of analysis remains the Sub-
ject that is biased by desire. In other words, for Lacan it is exactly the 
consciousness that is limited and individual, whereas the unconscious is 
intersubjective and permeated with the clamor of reality, being in its own 
turn the repository of desire and the symbolic. In psychoanalysis, eman-
cipation is either understood via the hegemony of the unconscious or dis-
missed altogether as the form of vitalism. In Soviet psychology and phi-
losophy it was the other way round. Consciousness had nothing to do with 
introspection, it was the assemblage of the objectively-biased social phe-
nomena. Objective reality is viable by the token of a human consciousness 
being part of its material dialectics. And last but not least, consciousness 
is the form of the voluntary demand for the general, for the objective. The 
subject is not studying itself but is constructing the objective.
In Freud’s work on sexuality, both its social and physiological param-
eters are superceded by psychics and are thus deprived of physical, so-
matic and hence materialist impact, which would enable them to be more 
directly dependent on social and economic factors. The reduction of sexu-
ality to a biological dimension would enable it to be redirected to the 
sphere of the genital and its innervations, which is actually antisexual 
and applies to sex just as to material necessity—without the troublesome-
ness of individual psychics and its traumatic bond with familial and per-
sonal biographies.
According to Voloshinov, Freud is not interested in any material 
functions of the somatic, but rather by its subjective impact on psychics; 
that is, he is trying to determine this impact from within psychics itself. 
What is important for him is the reflection of the somatic in the “soul,” or 
psyche, no matter what these somatic phenomena might be beyond the 
psyche. Voloshinov dismisses Freud’s theory of erogenous zones, since 
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work exercised by them; he is preoccupied only with the subjective psy-
chic equivalents of these zones and their place in the psychoanalytically-
determined libido. In Freudianism, Voloshinov writes: 
Freud makes no provision for a physiological theory of the erogenous 
zones, he takes no stock whatever of the chemistry or their physiological 
relationship with other parts of the body. It is only their psychical equiv-
alents that he subjects to analysis and investigation, that is, he focuses 
attention on the role played by subjective presentations and desires, as-
sociated with the erogenous zones, in the psychical life of a human indi-
vidual and from that individual’s inner, introspective point of view. […] 
The internal secretion of the sex glands, its influence on the operation 
and form of other organs, its relationship with the constitution of the 
body,—all these processes, detectable in the external material world, are 
left completely undefined by Freud. How the role of an erogenous zone 
in the material composition of the body connects with the role it plays in 
the subjective psyche, taken in isolation, is a question for which Freud 
provides us no answer. As a result, we are presented with a kind of dupli-
cation of erogenous zones: What happens with erogenous zones in the 
psyche becomes something completely separate and independent of 
what happens with the psychically, chemically, and biologically in the 
material organism (Voloshinov 1976: 71).
Voloshinov is insisting here that the body and organism should not 
be inscribed complementarily into the realm of psychics and sexuality, 
so as to make the objective body endowed with the innermost and psy-
chically complex of drives and imaginary associations, thus generating 
some sort of introspective imaginary of a body. Voloshinov is calling for 
the following: psychics should complement the objective body and be 
inscribed into the objective social surrounding. This premise is very im-
portant in understanding not only Andrey Platonov’s anthropology, but 
more generally for interpreting the ethics of numerous cultural, artistic, 
and political phenomena of Soviet socialism with its mistrust of desire 
and pleasure. 
Again, the debate against desire and enjoyment among representa-
tives of Soviet psychology and philosophy—Voloshinov, Vygotsky, Leon-
tiev, Ilyenkov—resided in the conjecture that along with subjective self­
introspection as the realm of desires, imaginaries, and emotions there is 
an objective dimension of human activity, conditioned by outward experi-
ence, and in it desire is not a prevailing component at all. The objective 
experience has to rely on completely different material components of 
behavior, which have very little to do with desires, emotions and imagi-
naries (phantasms). Desire in its own turn is engendered by libidinal 
economy, hence the privileged role of the unconscious that brings forth 
the dimension of the libidinal as a feature of capitalist production. But to 
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repeat again: what is not envisioned in psychoanalysis is what happens if, 
by the token of the evacuation of libidinal economy, the function and the 
toil of desire expires. 
So it is only in the light of subjective self-consciousness that the map 
of our psychic life seems to be the struggle and trouble of libidinally bi-
ased desires and imaginaries. Self-consciousness and self-introspection 
cannot be the source for objective motives of life and social or class strug-
gle. Such an argument leads us as far as to assert the extreme dimension 
of the general, of the idea as the radicalness of the non-self. In this case it 
is not the impact of sexuality that influences the social or linguistic realm 
(as is the case with Lacan)—when the social infrastructure is permeated 
with the pleasure principle and libidinality—but the opposite: the gener-
al, the social consciousness, the idea, occupy the body—physiologically 
preserving functions of sex as a reflex, but unable to exercise sexuality. 
Then, communist society would be the society that would not need any 
Anti-Sexus device whatsoever. It would dispense with sexuality in favor of 
the dialectics between direct physical needs and social goals.
IV
When we place into doubt all kinds of liberalisms and their libertar-
ian and permissive rhetoric; when we, consequently, claim that liberalism 
is no less embedded in ideology than any authoritarian society of histori-
cal socialism, we imply that by the same token (since liberalism is also an 
ideology) societies of historical communism might have been no less “lib-
eral” despite their authoritarian infrastructure.4 If we follow such an argu-
ment, then liberalism would function as ideology, whereas idea and ideol-
ogy, in their own turn, would be considered as something cracked and 
differentiated. We should not then be so intimidated by the symbolic di-
mension of the idea (and ideology), since it is also evolving in the regime 
of difference and deviation. But what I would endeavor to assume in refer-
ence to Platonov and Soviet cultural ethics would be the converse logic, 
which I shall now lay out. 
It is not that sexuality can be  extended into the zone of the social or 
the zone of the sublime, nonetheless preserving its libidinal character so 
that the ideal stays permeated by the “other paths” of libidinality, the ar-
gument discussed by Aaron Schuster in his explication of the libidinal 
4 This logic is often applied in Slavoj Žižek’s arguments mentioned in his nu-
merous presentations. In his conversations he often mentions that the embodiments of 
disciplinary regimes—the Soviet army, or jail, for example, were organized as devia-
tions, as corrupt forms of rule, whereas the permissiveness of liberal society might ex-
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(2013: 41–47).5 On the contrary, the sublime, the delibidinized, invades 
material and immanent bodies and things, exerting the dimension of gen-
erality and idealness, which the body as a material object can not often 
endure. It is not that sexuality and the libidinal become dematerialized in 
ideology, but the idea gets materialized in a body. Death is therefore nev-
er tragic to Platonov, because the death of body is not experienced as the 
end. It is interesting that while in Western modernism there are so many 
metaphors of living corpses, of the dead who are bodily alive, in Soviet 
prose even when the body is on the verge of survival, the life and struggle 
still go on. This is because life resides in the idea of communism, rather 
than in the finite body. But such an idea is embodied in concrete human 
bodies. Hence, what is really tragic is the lack of communism by its non-
implementability in the finite life of finite people.
The claim against ideology and any hegemony of an idea is that it is 
actually the same as power and authority. But in the case of Platonov as 
well as many other cases from the Soviet socialist context, the idea cannot 
be identified with power, since power itself might happen to be a devia-
tion from an idea.  If we take Platonov’s stories: Chevengur (1978), The 
Foundation Pit (2009), “Djan” (2008), or his novel Happy Moscow (2012) we 
see that sex is not banished or limited by any imperative in them. Sex as 
the material function of body is always present. Its difference from sexu-
ality is just that it functions as a simple necessity, accessible despite an 
extremely poor life, where the imaginaries and phantasms of desire are 
substituted by the toil of “building” communism—without any surplus 
economy and its elements, that is, without the libidinality that would 
construct itself as sexuality. 
There is an eloquent episode in Platonov’s “The River Potudan” 
(2008: 225–47).  Nikita, Ljuba’s husband, has sexual intercourse with her 
for the first time after hesitating to do so for a long time. Platonov de-
scribes this moment as a “poor and inevitable pleasure, from which Nikita 
didn’t acquire more joy than he hitherto experienced with Ljuba without 
it.” (2008: 245). In another of Platonov’s novels, Happy Moscow, the chief 
protagonist Moscow Chestnova says:
“I’ve just worked it out—why it is that people’s lives together are so bad. 
It’s bad because it’s impossible to unite through love. I’ve tried so many 
times, but nothing ever comes of it—nothing but some kind of mere de-
light. You were with me just now—and what did you feel? Something 
astonishing? Something wonderful? Or nothing much?”
“Nothing much,” agreed Semyon Sartorius.
5 In his comment to Platonov’s “The Anti-Sexus,” Aaron Schuster emphasizes 
this feature—namely, the incongruence between genital sexuality and the libidinal 
drives as theorized in Freud’s interpretation of the libido (2013).
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“My skin always feels cold afterward,” pronounced Moscow. “Love can-
not be communism. I’ve thought and thought and I’ve seen that it just 
can’t. One probably should love—and I will love. But it’s like eating 
food—it’s just a necessity, it’s not the main life.”
Sartorius was hurt that his love, gathered during the course of a whole 
life, should perish unanswered the first time. But he understood Mos-
cow’s excruciating thought: that the very best of feelings lies in the cul-
tivation of another human being, in sharing the burden and happiness of 
a second, unknown life, and that the love which comes with embraces 
brings only a childlike, blissful joy, and does nothing to solve the task of 
drawing people into the mystery of a mutual existence (Platonov 2012: 
53).
This passage is reminiscent of Voloshinov’s claims that self-con-
sciousness can only be the reflection of class consciousness, since realiz-
ing oneself is only possible via the glance of another representative of 
one’s class; any personal, linguistic or intimate reactions can only stem 
from objective roots (Voloshinov 1976: 17–29).
V
Returning to the issue of property in the context of sexuality we 
could emphasize that sexuality is much more dependent on the impact of 
property machines than it is constructed by traumatic or perverse under-
currents—this is the aspect that is somehow ignored in psychoanalysis. 
Following our assumption made above, sexuality can not be constituted 
without capitalist production and without surplus economy: it is but the 
consequence of the libidinality of desire and to its fusion with phantas-
matic imaginaries. Sexuality and desire should have a backup, which has 
to be materially designed and embodied as the program of desire. The 
extremity of shortage economy which was the “normal” condition for so-
cialism does not produce enough surplus in economy, in imaginaries, in 
commodity production and in production itself. The fact that a thing, an 
object, is produced via its use value evicts the phantasmatic parameters of 
things and bodies reducing the commodities to their crude utilitarian 
function, general necessity, removing from them the surplus of attrac-
tiveness. In such conditions the very form of commodity distribution has 
to de facto eliminate the possibility of libidinal desire and sexuality, since 
they are but a satellite of surplus economy. The question then would be 
whether the non-libidinal and non-capitalist economy would need a psy-
choanalytical lexicon at all. 
If we look at the zones of poor life in the framework of a capitalist 
economy we can observe a condition, obscenely manifested in postsocial-
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an economy is either too innovative to automatically permeate social pro-
duction, or not materially implementable whatsoever. If in the spheres of 
a non­profit socialist economy sexuality is constructed without a libidinal 
surplus, in the impoverished zones of the already capitalist, but still prim-
itive, surplus economy the phantasm of libidinally biased enjoyment is 
already there, yet it can not be easily achieved because it is still too “ex-
pensive.” This is because sex in conditions where it has not yet become 
the proper “language” of sexuality (sexuality understood as discourse in 
the Foucauldian sense) is often used as currency to pay for the future ma-
terial embodiment of attractive phantasmatic images. In the conditions of 
an impoverished but already capitalist economy, sexuality as the realm of 
libidinal pleasure is still remote. But what would be achievable or acces-
sible is the task of striving towards such pleasure—the quest to either 
acquire the attractiveness of the libidinally desired body, or to become 
such a body—that is impossible without the culture of consumption and 
commodification. 
Interestingly, it is exactly in the conditions of a poor economy that 
the commodity items are at stake (as in Pasolini’s movies Mamma Roma 
[1962], or Accattone [1961]). Sex for impoverished women (mostly in the 
mode of prostitution) is not yet embodying any desire or sexual pleasure 
at all. Desire is invested in the quest to acquire more property. The same 
could be said about the early post-Soviet social economic situation. Here 
the phantasmatic imaginary is prosperity and feminine attractiveness, 
exactly identified with the hunt for commodities. Such a mode of material 
life is already biased by a libidinal economy, but its “sexualization” has 
not yet taken place. The traumatic object of desire in it is not sexual plea-
sure and enjoyment, but an acquisition of the novel items of imaginary 
private property which can unleash a striving for the libidinal, but out of 
which a fully constructed sexuality has not yet emerged. This is why after 
the demise of authoritarian socialism one confronts so many examples of 
sexual abuse and victimization instead of feminist agencies and sexual 
freedom, because sexuality on such a transitory stage functions as a cur-
rency exchange rather than lust or the phantasm of liberation. To repeat 
once more, desire in such cases is conditioned by the quest for property 
accumulation and not sexual desire. Those who have only recently come 
out of the social context of use value are not yet able to properly exercise 
their libidinality.
As a comparison I would like to briefly refer to the plot of Nympho-
maniac (2013) a recent film by Lars von Trier. Desire functions here as 
pure surplus, it has an absolutely phantasmatic character and is detached 
from physical necessity. This is the reason why it can not saturate physi-
cal need even in the smallest degree. Yet it is this phantasmatically pro-
jected attractiveness of sexuality that gears desire, whilst simultaneously 
not being able to saturate it. Such phantasm, such desire, is of course 
completely detached from social context. However, it is precisely in 
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a   society biased by consumption and commodity fetishism that we will 
not witness any articulate existential demand for a commodity or refer-
ence to it in everyday life. This is because in the conditions of a developed 
libidinal economy, when there is no social experience of scarcity, a com-
modity stops being an existential necessity. A commodity is then not a 
basic need, but rather a variation of phantasmatic desire. Consequently, 
the more there is freedom of consumption the more the surplus form of 
an economy is concealed; what comes to the foreground are mainly phan-
tasmatic imaginaries, not directly referring to the commodity-oriented 
character of life and production. The protagonist of Von Trier’s Nympho-
maniac would not even question what stylistic, economic, monetary or 
physiological parameters construct the image of her sexuality and the 
phantasmatic stages of her libidinal striving—namely, she would not 
question what the surplus value is that makes all those parameters attrac-
tive? The issue here is not the prosperity of a concrete individual, namely 
of the protagonist, but a simple formula: if one has to think about sur-
vival, sexuality functions as a simple de-libidinized necessity rather than 
any imaginary about sexual pleasure. 
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